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Gender, Social Networks and Voting Behavior 
 
This paper examines how interpersonal social networks help explain the voting behavior 
of men and women.  We argue that the gender gap in voting is influenced by the partisan 
and gender composition of networks, rather than just the latter.  Building on this 
foundation, we explain how gendering in network construction and impact helps create a 
cleavage between men and women even under conditions that are often close to "random 
mixing."  Analysis of the 2000 American National Election Study shows the voting gap is 
related to men excluding women from political networks, men being less exposed to 
females who support Democrats, and men being more strongly influence by women who 
support Republicans.  The principal conclusion of the paper is that the role of social 
networks in explaining gendered voting is a function of combined partisan and gender 
segregation, principally by men. 
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There appear to be three ways in which social relations contribute 
to the maintenance of political differences. 
First…it is necessary to have a social basis for a political interest.  
It would be difficult in contemporary America, for example, to maintain 
voting differences by sex, because there are few policy issues persisting 
over a period of time that affect men and women differently.…  
Second, a necessary condition for the persistence of political 
differences is their transmission to succeeding generations.… 
Finally, given the origin of a voting difference in one generation 
and the transmittibility of it to the next, another condition is 
necessary…[m]embers of the social groups involved must be substantially 
more in contact with one another, socially and physically, than they are 
with opposing groups. 
Berelson et al., 1954, p. 74 
 
 This epigraph from Voting is a definitive statement on how social cleavages 
become politically significant.  Although very few scholars directly challenge the 
Columbia researchers’ theoretical claims, their example of “voting differences by sex” is 
striking in light of the gender voting gap that emerged in the last three decades of 
American politics (Ford 2006; Howell and Day 2000; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999; Wirls 
1986).  There is evidence that gender differences exist on policy (e.g., Box-
Steffensmeier, et al. 2004) and that there is intergenerational socialization (e.g, Jenkins 
n.d.), satisfying two of the theoretical conditions for a political condition.  However, the 
evidence suggesting that men and women have socially segregated interactions -- that 
there is "a social basis for a political interest" -- is less clear.   
 There is some social segregation between men and women in social institutions, 
particularly as it pertains to politics (Burns et al. 2001; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; 
Walsh 2004) and in specific institutional settings like the work place (McPhereson et al. 
2001).  Yet in relation to well-documented social homophily along racial and ethnic lines, 
gender differences in social interaction are relatively small (McPhereson et al. 2001).  
Social institutions like the Catholic Church and labor unions nevertheless provide more 
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opportunity for social segregation along religious and economic lines than do the social 
institutions that regulate social interaction between men and women.  And while it is 
clear that barriers to gender equality still exist in contemporary America, expanded 
economic and social opportunities for women may have increased opportunities for 
cross-gender social contacts in social institutions at a time when the gender gap has 
emerged more clearly as a significant cleavage.   
 Yet despite this fact, there is a politically meaningful cleavage between the 
partisan behavior of men and women.  This challenges the received wisdom about how 
social cleavages become politically meaningful and leads us to ask how does social 
interaction contribute – if at all – to gendered voting in American elections.  We address 
this question by examining the relationship between gender, political preference, and 
social communication.  Our analysis is guided by both traditional network explanations 
for voting behavior as well as the possibility of gendered social processes.  Using survey 
data from the 2000 National Election Study, we find that there is a clear divide between 
the political networks of men and women that is related to partisanship and gender.   
Although women have a notable level of gender equality in their interactions, men are far 
more likely to only include men into political discussion.  This segregation has 
consequences for the partisan signals respondents receive, with less political homophily 
in women’s networks and men more likely to discount the impact of women in their 
evaluations. 
 Our results build on arguments about both social influence and gendered voting.  
Regarding the former, they suggest that the condition of social and physical separation is 
not necessary for the formation of cleavages.  Although more stringent divisions may be 
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more politically potent, we should not overlook the power of less noticeable forms of 
segregation in the structure of discussion networks.  In this case, the evidence suggests 
that political homophily among men and their discounting of women’s opinions is 
sufficient support for gendered voting even when women do not exhibit the same 
characteritics.  With respect to gendered voting, the results support an interpretation that 
the gap is driven by men changing their behavior rather than women coalescing together.  
While our data do not allow us to study dynamics underlying gendered voting, they 
illuminate a model for understanding those dynamics.  Importantly, this model suggests 
that policy concerns shared by women will continue to be under-represented as men are 
more unified behind particular candidates and issues. 
The Puzzle of Gendered Voting in a World Not Segregated by Gender 
 Explanations of the gender gap largely focus on the impact of political issues and 
opinions on male and female vote choice (Conover and Sapiro 1993).  Research shows 
significant differences between men and women on “compassion issues,” such as social 
welfare and racial equality, and on issues of war or violence (Norris 2003, 156).  On 
domestic policy, women tend to be supportive of helping the disadvantaged (Cook and 
Wilcox 1991, 1111), creating jobs, reducing unemployment, providing government 
services (Box-Steffensmeier et al.  2004, 516), and environmental regulation (Howell and 
Day 2000).  Women show less support than men on defense spending (Wirls 1986, 319).  
Women are also more likely to oppose capital punishment and the use of force in 
domestic law enforcement (Howell and Day 2000).  Ironically, there appear to be few 
gender differences on opinions regarding (but not salience of) “women’s issues” such as 
abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (Box-Steffensmeier el al. 2004, 16; Norris 
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2003, 156).  In addition to addressing which issues drive the gender gap, this research 
tries to determine whether it is the difference of opinion on issues or the salience of those 
issues that is the primary determinant of gendered voting (Chaney et al. 1998). 
 While significantly advancing our understanding of gendered voting, this 
literature does not consider how these differences are buttressed by social relations.  As 
Berelson and his colleagues recognized, not all social cleavages are politically-relevant, 
and among those that are, there must be some social mechanism that sustains them.  From 
their perspective, political fault lines depend in large part on levels of contact within and 
between groups.  As levels of within-group contact increase and between-group contact 
decrease, they expected the political significance of a social cleavage to become more 
politically important.  As noted above, the problem of applying this argument to the 
gender gap in voting is that there are ample opportunities for men and women to interact.   
To be sure, men and women are not on equal ground when they interact with each 
other.  Men are less likely to identify women as political discussants than women are to 
identify men (Klofstad et al. 2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).  Women are less 
inclined to offer political opinions to others – i.e., political proselytizing – than are men, 
except when women candidates run (Hansen 1997).  And men tend to see women as less 
knowledgeable about politics, potentially degrading social influence across gender lines 
(Mendez and Osborn 2010; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Huckfeldt 2001).  Nevertheless, 
gender does not on the surface appear to be as important in producing segregation in 
social interaction than other factors such partisanship (MacKuen 1992; Finifter 1974), 
religion (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993), class (Marsden 1997), and other factors.  
This is because these other differences overlap with social institutions (such as parties, 
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churches, and unions) that buttress within-group relations.  The one social institution 
most apt to affect gender gaps – marriage – works to bring their preferences and behavior 
together. 
Altogether this presents a series of questions about the role of social networks and 
gender in voting.  Is gendered voting related to men and women’s social networks?  If so, 
what process links social networks to voting?  Is it a function of differences in the gender 
or partisan composition of the networks?  Or, is a function of men and women being 
differently affected by the discussion partners? 
Social Network Models and Gendered Voting 
The Baseline Argument About Social Networks and Voting 
In what ways might interaction in social networks be related to gendered voting in 
American elections?  One possibility – which we consider the null hypothesis – is that 
gendered voting has nothing to do with social interaction between the sexes.  If that is the 
case, it implies that the political differences of men and women might arise naturally 
from socialization differences between men and women (Gilligan 1982) or from their 
different socioeconomic circumstances (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004).  Since men 
and women are not socially isolated in the U.S., this implies that social influence does not 
occur – or occur as strongly – across the sexes.  Even if men and women interact and 
exchange political information, the idea is that gender is unrelated to the content of those 
interactions and their impact on political behavior.  People are responsive to political 
information provided by members of their network, regardless of their gender and that of 
their discussants.  If this is the case, we should find that the influence of one person upon 
6 
the voting behavior of another might be dependent on their network, but that process does 
not differ by the gender of the respondent or its distribution in the network.   
Toward that end, we have two hypotheses derived from the social network 
literature.  The first expectation is that a respondent’s candidate preference is likely to 
mirror those of her discussants, regardless of the gender of the respondent or her 
discussants.  When we examine discussant pairs, we expect that the level of political 
homophily is the same across the possible pairings of male and female 
respondents/discussants.  A second hypothesis is that the influence of any particular 
network discussant is dependent on the rest of the network (Huckfeldt et al. 2004), a 
simple version of a network structure effect.  As with the first hypothesis, the expectation 
is that this process is independent of the gender composition of the network and the 
respondent.  These expectations, and others derived below, are displayed in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Gender, Network Composition, and Voting 
In contrast to this baseline network argument, gender identity might lead to 
gendered voting through social networks.  One possibility focuses on what we will call 
composition effects.  Underneath the social logic of voting is a focus on the 
communication of political information.  As the network becomes more biased toward 
one political choice over another, we expect that this is communicated to voters, and they 
feel pressure to conform to their network.  To the degree that there are significant 
differences in the networks of men and women, especially in ways that are politically 
relevant, we should expect a voting gap to emerge.    
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There are two possible ways that this might happen.  First, men and women might 
exhibit partisan differences in their network.  Since there is a partisan gender gap – with 
men being more Republican than women – we might find men and women have 
discussion networks that are more reflective of the parties they support.  Note that the 
political composition of the network might be unrelated to gender in this case, especially 
after accounting for a person’s partisanship.  The implication is that a correlation exists 
between individual partisanship and network partisanship that is not contingent on 
respondent or network gender, but that is relevant to their voting behavior. 
Yet the partisan balance of a network might also be a function of the gender of an 
individual and his or her discussion partners.  For the reasons outlined by Berelson and 
his colleagues, we might expect stark political and social segregation in order for 
networks to produce a gender voting gap.  But some segregation on those lines may be 
enough to produce an effect on voting.  Indeed, previous research shows that despite 
increasing equality among men and women in work life, substantial differences exist 
among the sexes in terms of their access to professional advancement (Applebaum et al.. 
2004), home responsibilities (Mezey 1978; Sapiro 1982), and types of organizational 
involvement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).   
A consequence of such differences is that men and women may be exposed to 
different opportunities for building networks that are related to these gendered processes.  
These, in turn, may create differential access to political information that is a function of 
both partisanship and gender.  In particular, the notion is that women who have female 
discussion partners are more likely to be even more pro-Democratic.  The logic of this is 
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that because women share both a partisan and gender identity, that they would be even 
more likely to support Democrats. 
Gender, Network Structure, and Voting 
Social influences on political behavior also depend on the clarity with which 
political information is communicated within networks, something that is dependent on 
how social interactions fits with other exchanges in a person's interpersonal networks 
(e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 2004).  Though the clarity with which people perceive the political 
content in social relations is not independent of network composition and structure, 
neither is it entirely dependent on them.  In particular, the clarity of information 
communicated between people is related to each discussant's position in the network.  
This is, of course, a process that could be gendered.  
Along these lines, previous research (Huckfeldt, Brickell, and Sprague 1995, 
Chapter 10; Mendez and Osborn 2010) demonstrates a strong asymmetry in how political 
information flows between men and women.  In particular, women are less likely to be 
named as political discussants by men, and men perceive women to be less 
knowledgeable about politics.  To the extent that social influence depends on how clearly 
political information flows across networks, this research implies that the impact of a 
network on political behavior may differ in cross-gender dyads.  Specifically, men should 
be less susceptible to influence from women because women are generally perceived as 
less important politically.  Stated differently, men will discount information from women 
because they are seen as being less informed on political matters.  Because of the 
asymmetry in these communication patterns, however, women should not exhibit the 
same sensitivity to the gender distribution of the network. 
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As Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) demonstrate, survey respondents are 
more likely to accurately identify their discussant’s political preferences when those 
preferences are shared by a majority of the remaining network.  An implication of their 
argument is that, in determining how to vote, the influence of any one discussion partner 
depends on the cues provided by the rest of the network.  We focus on the possibility that 
men and women might rely differently on these elements of the network as a function of 
the discussant’s gender.  In particular, men might be less influenced by a single 
discussant and more affected by the residual network when that discussant is a woman, 
and vice versa. 
Data 
To explore these hypotheses, we use data from the 2000 American National 
Election Study (ANES).  In addition to the traditional questions the ANES includes for 
studying voting behavior, it solicits information on each respondent’s social network.  
Toward this end, respondents were asked for up to four names of the people with whom 
they talk politics.1  Respondents reported how they knew each discussant, how frequently 
they discussed politics, their perception of the discussant’s political knowledge, and their 
perception of the discussant’s vote choice.2  We analyze these data in two ways.  First, 
we examine the whole networks of men and women.  For these analyses, the data are 
organized with the respondent as the unit of analysis and information on the network 
dispersed across columns.  Second, we examine network dyads in order to get a handle 
on how specific discussants – and their political and gender characteristics – affect the 
                                                 
1
 Although this “political matters” generator seemingly taps only political networks, there are very few 
differences in the information provided in these scenarios when compared to the more general “most 
important matters” name generator (Burt 1985) used by sociologists (Klofstad et al. 2006). 
2
 Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics are provided in Table A and B in the Appendix. 
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respondent’s behavior.  In these situations, the data are organized by respondent-
discussant dyads.  Because this over-represents respondents with larger social networks, 
we employ the procedure used by Huckfeldt et al. (2004) to correct for what they label 
social autoregression.3 
In addition to including information on social networks, the primary advantage of 
the 2000 ANES data is that they come from a random sample of national respondents.  
Although there are other surveys that include more extensive measures of social influence 
measures (e.g., the 1996 Indianapolis-St. Louis Study), they are based in one or two 
communities.  Although the gender gap undoubtedly exists in all manner of communities, 
those manifestations may be affected by a wide variety of factors that are difficult to 
control, such as female office holders or different norms toward the treatment of women. 
There are two primary drawbacks to our data.  First, the absence of interviews for 
a random sample of named discussants limits our analysis to respondent perceptions of 
network interaction.  Because respondent perceptions of a discussant’s vote preference 
depend upon both respondent partisanship and the distribution of voter preferences in the 
rest of the network (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004), these data may understate 
levels of disagreement in networks and reflect reciprocal influence of the respondents on 
their network.  On a related note, men and women may have notably different perceptions 
of the politics of their network partners.  Second, we are unable to account for the 
influence of factors specific to the 2000 election that might influence the distribution of 
political preferences across networks or between men and women.  In both cases, these 
                                                 
3
 The procedure is straightforward – we employ robust standard errors within respondent clusters and 
control for other aspect of the network outside of the particular discussant.  See Huckfeldt, Johnson, and 
Sprague (2004) for additional details. 
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limits restrict our ability to make strong claims about causality, especially beyond this 
particular election. 
Political Composition of Networks: The Impact of Gender and Political Preference  
Female and Male Networks 
We begin by examining the social networks of men and women.  In Panel A of 
Table 1, we see that among all respondents, there are significant differences between men 
and women in regards to the size of their political networks, the average level of political 
discussion, the average level of support for Bush, the number of women in a network, and 
the intimacy in the network.  Women are less likely to report having a political network 
than men and engage in less political discussion in their networks than men.  Support for 
Bush also varies, with men showing more support for Bush than women.  There are no 
differences in the proportion of Gore discussants in male and female networks.  Female 
respondents are also more likely to report having higher numbers of women in their 
networks and more intimate networks -- meaning more family members -- than men. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 When we compare only those men and women who can identify at least one 
discussant in Panel B of Table 1, we find that many of these differences disappear.  This 
is surprising in light of research suggesting sex is not a predictor of social isolation 
(McPhereson et al. 2006).  Yet, for example, the frequency of political discussion does 
not differ significantly for men and women.  Differences in levels of support for Bush are 
also statistically insignificant.  We do find that men still have larger political networks 
than women -- consistent with the research of McPhereson et al. 2006 -- remain less 
likely to include women in their networks, and report networks with lower levels of 
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intimacy than women.  Interestingly, once women report having a political network, the 
average level of network political knowledge increases to a mean level of 1.29, while 
men’s levels increase to 1.23.  Notably we do not find women opting into all Democratic 
networks or men opting into all Republican networks, evidence that in the aggregate 
women and men are not sorting into partisan enclaves that would likely exist in religious 
and/or ethnic groups. 
In broad strokes, this evidence sheds some light on our different hypotheses.  It 
does not support the hypothesis that respondent gender is strongly related to the political 
signals received by men and women from their whole network, especially once we 
account for the lower propensity of women to name one or more discussants.  On the 
other hand, these data show that there are strong and persistent gender differences in the 
people included by men and women in their networks.  Since men are less likely to 
include women in their networks and women are more likely on average to be 
Democratic partisans than are males, this suggests that gender sorting in the selection of 
networks may lead to voting differences between men and women.  However, as noted 
above, this is relationship is not so strong as to clearly account for the gender voting gap. 
Political Cues Provided by Men and Women 
We begin examining this possibility further by looking at levels of political 
agreement in vote choice between respondents and discussants broken down by gender.  
In Table 2, the most striking finding is that the highest levels of agreement in vote choice 
are between male respondents and male discussants who voted for Bush.  Among male 
respondents with a male discussant, 52.7% voted for Bush indicating the highest levels of 
agreement between a respondent and a discussant are when both are male and Bush 
13 
supporters.  In comparison, only 38.7% of male respondents’ female discussants voted 
for Bush.  A similar gender-partisan polarization occurs for female respondents.  Among 
female respondents, we see that 47.6% of female discussants voted for Gore in 
comparison to 36.1% of male discussants.  But what is different for women respondents 
is that their male discussants are not as ardently pro-Bush as they are with male 
respondents.  This difference is attributable to female respondents reporting that male 
discussants have either “no” preference or support some “other” candidate. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Overall, this evidence shows gender homophily is related to partisan homophily; 
the gender composition of the network overlaps with the respondent’s partisan cues.  
Because women have more females in their network and their male discussants are less 
likely to support Bush, our female respondents are exposed to more pro-Gore information 
than pro-Bush information.  Interestingly, the political cues men receive are different, 
both because their male discussants are more supportive of Bush and because their 
networks are four times as likely to include other men.  This is evidence of a 
straightforward composition effect, but also with gendering in balance of partisan cues 
and their strength.  And most important for our purposes, it suggests that this imbalance 
in the information men and women glean from their network is only evident we when 
account for both gender and politics.  
Table 3 takes the analysis one step further by examining discussant vote choice 
according to respondent vote choice and gender of both discussants and respondents (a 
dyad-level analysis).  Among male respondents who voted for Gore, 77.7% of their 
female discussants also voted for Gore, compared to 61.8% of male discussants.   Among 
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male respondents who voted for Bush, 72.2% of their female discussants also voted for 
Bush, compared to 73.6% of male discussants.  This high level of agreement with both 
female and male discussants implies that male Bush supporters are highly discriminating 
about the women they let into their political networks. We also see that among female 
respondents who voted for Gore, 57.6% of male discussants also voted for Gore, 
compared to 66.7% of female discussants.  Among female respondents who voted for 
Bush, 75.3% of male discussants also voted for Bush, compared to 67.6% of female 
discussants.  Thus, female respondents who support Bush have more variation in their 
networks than their male counterparts. 
Altogether these results suggest that gender may be functioning as a cue for 
agreement in political networks.  For men, the level of support in the network is 
somewhat dependent upon gender.  In fact, women may be serving as a cue for 
Democratic men, and men may be serving as a cue for Republican men.  For women, 
though, it does not appear to make as much of a difference if the discussant is a man or 
woman.  Again, the failure of men to include women in their networks has consequences 
for the political messages that they receive from their networks, generally pushing them 
in the direction of the Republican party. 
In terms of Bereslon et al.’s conditions for a social cleavage, there is evidence of 
“random mixing” for females – women respondents talk to both men and women and get 
exposed to both Republican and Democratic messages.  But the story is different for male 
respondents, who demonstrate evidence of segregation in that they are more likely to talk 
to men and those men are more strongly Republican.  This effect is less related to the 
respondent’s gender than it is to his or her own political leanings and the discussant’s 
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gender.  In a phrase, it seems that men are more choosy about whom they talk to about 
politics. 
Partisanship, Network Gender, and Network Political Composition 
 The previous analysis shows that the composition of discussion networks is 
gendered.  In relation to our hypotheses, this suggests that a standard network framework 
does not apply – partisanship is not the only factor in understanding the political 
composition of networks.  Instead, it is the interaction between the discussant’s gender 
and the respondent’s political predilections.  This occurs partly because gender overlaps 
with political preferences, allowing both men and women the ability to use it as a signal 
in identifying disagreeable network partners.  At the same time, the fact that men are 
generally more resistant toward including women in their networks implies that when 
they do talk to women, they are more aware of potential political differences and only 
include them when they are agreeable discussants.  In other words, discussant gender, 
might serve as a cue that activates partisanship and/or preference as a criterion for 
inclusion in the network.  
 To explore this idea further, we regressed the percent of a respondent’s network 
support for Gore and Bush on respondent partisanship, the proportion of women in the 
network, and an interaction between the two.  Individual level controls were added for 
education, age, union membership, marital status, and respondent gender, the last of 
which was also interacted with the network gender.  Since people with larger political 
networks have more opportunities for exposure to disagreement, we control for the size 
of the network (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2001).  The results are reported in 
Table 4. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
Most interesting for our purposes is that the political content of respondent 
networks is a function of gender, partisanship, and the gender of the network.  As 
interpreting these results is not straightforward just by looking about the statistical results 
(Friederich 1982), we plot the different combinations in Figure 2.  The larger dots on 
each line represent the impact of network gender based on either gender (on the left hand 
side) or partisanship (on the right hand side) for how much of the network supports Bush 
and Gore.  The small dots on either side of this estimate are the lower and upper 
boundaries of the confidence interval for the coefficient. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Consider first the impact of network gender on the amount of Bush and Gore 
support for men and women.  The most important differences here seem to be driven 
more by whether we're examining Bush network support versus Gore rather than the sex 
of the respondent.4  In the model for Bush, the confidence intervals of men and women 
overlap with each other, suggest that there is not much difference in how they react to 
women in their network.  That said, the coefficient for women is statistically significant 
at the .05 level and having more women in the network does make them more favorable 
to Bush.  When looking at support for Gore in the network, we again see that differences 
between men and women are not stark.  However, in this case both are likely to have 
more Gore supporters in their network if there are more women in their network.  
                                                 
4
 Although respondent gender was unrelated to the political composition of the network – ruling out the 
possibility that it is the primary source of differential gender cues – we re-estimated our models separately 
for men and women to allow for possible heterogeneity in how these processes operate.  The results are 
similar to what are reported in Table 4 with a handful of exceptions.  First, the effect of network gender on 
Bush support is statistically significant and positive for women, but remains statistically insignificant for 
men.  Second, both the direct effect of network gender (.34 for men and .26 for women) and its interaction 
with partisanship on the composition of Gore vote is larger for men than women (0.10 and 0.07, 
respectively). The results are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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Overall, it seems that increased gender homophily is related to more clarity in women's 
networks in the sense that there is more support for both candidates (though much more 
for Gore).  For men, having more women in their network makes the network 
significantly more pro-Gore. 
Stronger still is the interaction of network gender and individual partisanship.  
Considering the results for average percent of the network supporting Bush, the graph 
shows that Republicans end up in more Bush-supporting networks but that independents’ 
and Democrats’ networks actually become less pro-Bush.  Conversely, having more 
women in a network ends up making it comprised of a greater proportion of Gore 
supporters for everyone regardless of their political preferences.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
To see how this plays out, we display the impact of these variables on the political 
composition of networks in Figure 3.  For purposes of this simulation, we computed the 
effects of these variables against a baseline respondent who was male, had a high school 
education, was married, not in a union, 45 years of age, and with a three-person social 
network.  Panel B shows that the inclusion of women in social networks has a particularly 
strong impact on self-identified strong Democrats.  Moving from a network with no 
women to a fully female network increases the proportion of Gore voters in the network 
by just over 50%.  Independents are similarly affected, though the magnitude of the effect 
is slightly more than half that size.  Finally, we see about a 10% increase among 
Republicans.  A similar pattern occurs for the Bush proportion of the network.  Among 
strong Republicans, moving from no females to a network that is entirely female 
increases the percentage of Bush support by approximately 20%.  There is a positive 
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increase among independents, though the substantive effects are quite mild (and 
statistically insignificant when computed using Friederich’s formula). And finally, it has 
a strong negative effect for Democrats. 
  It seems apparent that the political composition of networks is not differentiated 
solely, or even primarily, by the gender of respondents.  It is related to the number of 
women in the network, in combination with respondent partisanship.  To the extent that 
the gender gap in voting is based on cues received in social networks, it would seem that 
this comes primarily from the fact that partisanship is related to network composition and 
the simple fact that men are more Republican than are women.  In other words, we cannot 
look at the proportion of men and women in a network to explain gendered voting.  For 
Republicans, having more women in the network is associated with having more Bush 
and Gore supporters; for everyone else, it is associated with having more Gore 
supporters. 
This implies that discussant gender serves as a way of alerting respondents – 
either by accident or on purpose – to how a person fits with their own politics.  For men, 
having more women in their network jeopardizes their ability to have a supportive 
network.  This may explain why men's networks exhibit more political homophily in 
Tables 2 and 3 -- bring women into the network cuts at the natural tendency of people to 
avoid disagreeable political discussants (Festinger 1957).  Second – though more subtly 
and less strongly – this part of the process is gendered as men and women react 
differently.  In particular, women are more sensitive to the combined role of partisanship 
and gender in screening the Republican parts of their networks while men are more 
responsive in the Democratic end.   
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Network Structure and Social Influence on Candidate Evaluation 
We now turn our attention away from the composition of the network to its 
consequences for candidate evaluation.  Even when men and women interact and supply 
each other with information that should cut at the core of the gender gap, we must also 
consider the possibility that this information has little or no consequence when exchanged 
between men and women.  Therefore, we examine how the impact of men and women as 
discussants may be diluted through the distribution of preferences among other 
discussants.  We do this by estimating an autoregressive model of social influence 
outlined in Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) where the unit of analysis here is the 
discussant-respondent dyad.  As respondents can appear more than one time in the data 
set, we correct for correlated errors using robust standard errors for respondent-clusters.  
The dependent variable is the change in the respondent’s evaluation of Al Gore and 
George Bush from the pre-election survey to the post-election survey, coded so that 
positive numbers indicate increasing affection for the two candidates. 
The social influence model includes two measures of social influence: (1) the 
discussant’s political preference and (2) the amount of agreement with the discussant in 
the remainder of the network.  We include a control for individual partisanship, the 
respondent’s pre-election evaluation of Gore, and an interaction term between discussant 
vote and residual candidate support in the network.  Unfortunately, our measure of 
discussant preferences may itself be a product of the respondent’s preferences, meaning 
that our results are subject to endogeneity bias (Kenny 1994).  We look to future work to 
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use different measures of discussant preferences – such as partisanship, which is a more 
stable measure – to attack this issue more directly.5  We estimate the model separately for 
1) change in feeling for Gore and Bush and 2) all permutations of respondent and 
discussant gender.  We specifically look at whether our measures of social influence 
depend upon gender homophily in the respondent-discussant dyad.   
Interpreting social influence in this model depends on evaluating an interaction 
between each discussant's vote preference and the preferences of the rest of the network.  
With two candidates, four type of gender-discussant dyads, and four values of the 
interacting term (the residual network can have 0, 1, 2, and 3 as possible values), we have 
thirty-two different statistical tests to evaluate.  As this complicates interpretation, we 
report the statistical models in Tables C and D in the Appendix and focus our discussion 
on a summary of the statistical results and a graph of coefficient effects.  Each coefficient 
listed in Table 5 shows the effect of the discussant -- direct influence -- on the change in 
feeling towards one of the candidates.  There is strong evidence that candidate attitudes 
are embedded in social processes, with 20 of 32 of the coefficients obtaining some level 
of statistical significance.  By itself, this is neither surprising (given previous research) or 
that interesting given our focus on gender. 
[Table 5 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
We first examine the results of the model of changing attitudes toward Gore.  
Here we see that there is significant influence from discussants of each gender to 
respondents of each gender.  However, that influence is restricted to those networks in 
which there are no other Gore discussants or only one.  And, as can been seen in Figure 
                                                 
5
 The 2000 ANES did not ask respondents for their perceptions of the discussant’s partisanship. 
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4, it is in that area where there are the least differences between the different types of 
dyads.  In other words, there seems to be social influence and it does not seem to be 
conditioned by the gender of the respondent or discussant.  There are two additional 
observations to be made here. First, the impact of any discussant declines as the network 
becomes more supportive overall, demonstrating that there are declining returns from 
each discussant as the entire network becomes more supportive.  Second, the declining 
effect of the discussant influence is less steep for same-gender pairs.  The effect is not 
statistically significant for male-male pairs, but is for female-female pairs (p<.10) with up 
to two additional supportive discussants.  All in all, the implication is that women and 
men seem to place at least slightly more emphasis on their same-gender discussants even 
in the context of more political cohesive networks. 
A different pattern presents itself when examining feelings towards Bush.  There 
is still a pattern of diminishing returns in the effect of a Bush-supporting discussant as the 
Bush support in the network grows, but it only occurs when men are the discussant.  For 
men, as their network becomes more pro-Bush they are less likely to weigh the opinion of 
their discussants; that is especially true for male-male dyads where the individual 
discussant is not important after one other Bush voter is included.  A different story 
emerges when we consider female discussants.  For men, there are no meaningful 
"declining effects."  If the network has no other discussants backing Bush or only one 
other, that single female Bush supporter has a strong positive effect on evaluations of 
both.  If the respondent is a woman, having more Bush-supporting networks actually 
increases the impact of a pro-Bush female discussant. 
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Our interpretation of these complicated results is relatively straightforward.  
When women act according to the stereotype that they are more Democratic than men, 
their impact on candidate attitudes is in some sense unremarkable -- it is the same as any 
other discussant.  However, when they act "out of character," they have an opportunity to 
exert significant influence.  In those cases, it is because the socially-supplied information 
is more informative and novel, that it is more impactful.  All in all, this story does not 
seem to be about gender and politics alone, but about their combined impact. 
We are hesitant to draw strong conclusions about causality on the basis of this 
evidence, as endogenous influence and network selection serve as potential sources of 
statistical biases.  However, the evidence is consistent with the argument that gender is 
important for understanding how much influence a discussant will have on a respondent’s 
view of the candidates.  The most consistent pattern we see is that females can influence 
people, but it is only under highly defined conditions.  Otherwise, the social influence 
process in this case seems more related to the composition of networks.  
Summary and Discussion 
 Overall, our results suggest that gendered patterns of social communication and 
network structure do play a role in contributing to the gender gap, though this role is far 
from simple.  Given Berelson’s remarks, this makes sense.  Women are in substantial 
contact with men.  Despite persistent differences among the sexes, they are not strictly 
separated according to any religious or other social institution that prohibit interaction.  
Further, we do not see the strong partisan divides between men and women that we see, 
for example, between African-Americans and whites.  However, it is fairly evident from 
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our analysis that social communication is shaped by gender to some extent, most likely in 
combination with expected factors such as partisanship. 
 In terms of network structure, we find that discussant gender and partisanship are 
working together in order to influence respondents.  For instance, we do not find that 
women are opting into all Democratic networks or that men are opting into all 
Republican networks.  Rather, gender and partisanship are working together, though their 
influence may be different on male and female respondents.  Gender homophily appears 
to be related to partisan messages as well.  For men, gender may be functioning as a cue 
for agreement more so than for women.  We find that men are less likely to include 
women in their networks, and when they do, they are more discriminating about the 
women they let into their networks.  Strong partisans, in particular, are very selective 
about the women they include in their networks. 
 When examining discussant influence, we find that gender similarity of networks 
matters more for women than men.  This is probably due to that fact that, as mentioned 
previously, men are heavily screening the women they let into their networks.  On the 
other hand, effects of discussant knowledge do not appear to be gendered although this 
must be interpreted cautiously due to men’s devaluation of women’s political knowledge. 
 Previous research on the gender gap indicates there is no simple explanation, but 
multiple, interrelated causes.  When examining the underlying foundations of social 
communication that might be contributing to this phenomenon, we find similar results in 
terms of complexity.  While gendered patterns of communication appear to be 
contributing to the gender gap, they are certainly not the only factor affecting social 
communication between men and women. 
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Figure 1.  Possible Effects of Gender and Social Networks on Voting Behavior. 
 
Source of 
Effect 
Social Networks Gendering in Social Networks 
  Composition Communication 
 
Political 
preferences 
 
The respondent’s vote 
is likely to correlate 
with the average 
network vote. 
 
 
Women are more 
Democratic than men 
and therefore have 
more Democrats in 
their network. 
 
Women who have 
more women in their 
network will have 
more Democrats as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
Structure of 
network 
The influence of a 
disagreeing discussant 
is dependent on the 
remainder of the 
network. 
 
 The impact of female 
discussants on males 
depends more heavily 
on the rest of the 
network. 
 
The impact of female 
discussants on female 
respondents will 
depend less on the rest 
of the network. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Full Social Networks by Gender.   
 
Panel A.  All Respondents. 
 
 
Network Property 
 
Respondent Gender 
 
Difference 
 
Male  
 
Female 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Size 
 
1.72 
 
1.55 
 
1.51 
 
1.49 
 
  0.21* 
 
Political Talk 
 
  1.34 
 
1.07 
 
  1.24 
 
1.08 
 
  0.11* 
 
Political Knowledge 
 
0.81 
 
0.72 
 
0.80 
 
0.74 
 
  0.01 
 
Gore Support 
 
0.25 
 
0.37 
 
0.24 
 
0.38 
 
  0.01 
 
Bush Support 
 
0.29 
 
0.39 
 
0.24 
 
0.38 
 
  0.05* 
 
Gender 
 
0.22 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
 
0.37 
 
-0.09* 
 
Network Intimacy 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.37 
 
0.32 
 
0.40 
 
-0.07* 
*p<.05, two-tailed test 
 
Panel B.  Respondents Naming At Least One Discussant. 
 
 
Network Property 
 
Respondent Gender 
 
Difference 
 
Male  
 
Female 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Size 
 
2.61 
 
1.15 
 
2.43 
 
1.15 
 
.18* 
 
Political Talk 
 
2.04 
 
0.56 
 
1.99 
 
0.61 
 
.05   
 
Political Knowledge 
 
1.23 
 
0.52 
 
1.29 
 
0.51 
 
-.06 
 
Gore Support 
 
0.41 
 
0.39 
 
0.42 
 
0.41 
 
-.01 
 
Bush Support 
 
0.47 
 
0.40 
 
0.42 
 
0.42 
 
.05   
 
Gender 
 
0.33 
 
0.33 
 
0.50 
 
0.36 
 
 -.16* 
 
Intimacy 
 
 
0.38 
 
0.40 
 
0.52 
 
0.40 
  
-.14* 
*p<.05, two-tailed test 
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Table 2.  Discussant Political Preferences by Respondent and Discussant Gender. 
 
 
 
 
Discussant vote  
 
Female Respondents 
 
Male Respondents 
 
Female 
Discussant 
Male 
Discussant 
Female 
Discussant 
Male 
Discussant 
 
Percent Gore 
 
   47.6% 
(344) 
 
 
   36.1% 
(250) 
 
   48.6% 
(206) 
 
   34.5% 
(284) 
Percent Bush 
 
   39.6% 
(286) 
 
   45.2% 
(313) 
   38.7% 
(164) 
   52.7% 
(434) 
Percent Other / 
None 
 
   12.8% 
  (93) 
   18.6% 
(129) 
   12.7% 
  (54) 
   12.8% 
(106) 
Total 
 
 100% 
(723) 
 
  100% 
(692) 
 100% 
(424) 
 100% 
(824) 
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Table 3.  Discussant Vote Choice by Respondent Vote, Respondent Gender, and 
Discussant Gender. 
 
 
          Respondent Vote Choice 
 
Discussant Vote Choice Gore Bush 
 
Panel A.  Male Respondent / Male Discussant 
 
Percent Gore 
 
61.8% 
 
17.1% 
Percent Bush 28.2% 73.6% 
Percent Other 10.0%   9.3% 
 
 
 
Panel B.  Male Respondent / Female Discussant 
 
Percent Gore 
 
77.7% 
 
20.7% 
Percent Bush 11.2% 72.2% 
Percent Other 11.1%   7.1% 
 
 
 
Panel C.  Female Respondent / Male Discussant 
 
Percent Gore 
 
57.6% 
 
16.7% 
Percent Bush 24.8% 75.3% 
Percent Other 17.5%   8.0% 
 
 
 
Panel D.  Female Respondent / Female Discussant 
 
Percent Gore 
 
66.7% 
 
24.3% 
Percent Bush 22.2% 67.6% 
Percent Other 11.1%   8.1% 
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Figure 2.  The Effect of Gender Composition on the Political Composition of Social 
Networks for Men and Women. 
 
 
  
Figure 3.  Candidate Support as a Function of Network Gender and Partisanship.
 
Panel A.  Support for Bush Among the Respondent’s Discussants.
 
Panel B.  Support for Gore among the Respondent’s Discussants.
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Table 4.  The Effect of Respondent Partisanship and Network Gender Composition 
on Network Political Composition, OLS Regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Percent of Network 
Supporting Gore 
 
 
Percent of Network 
Supporting Bush 
 
Coef. 
 
S.E. 
 
Coef. 
 
S.E. 
 
Female 
 
Education 
 
Age 
 
Union Member 
 
Married 
 
Partisanship 
 
Network Size 
 
Network Gender 
 
Female * Network Gender 
 
Partisanship* Network Gender 
 
Constant 
 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.07 
 
-0.02 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
0.34 
 
-0.08 
 
0.08 
 
-0.06 
 
0.02 
 
0.00* 
 
0.00 
 
0.02** 
 
0.02 
 
0.00** 
 
0.01** 
 
0.04** 
 
0.04 
 
0.01** 
 
0.05 
 
-0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
0.11 
 
0.03 
 
0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 
0.02** 
 
0.00** 
 
0.01** 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
 
0.01** 
 
0.05 
N 
F 
R2 
Root MSE 
 
1595 
   97.32** 
      0.38 
      0.29 
        1595 
          101.30** 
              0.39 
              0.30 
*p<.05, two-tailed, **p<.01, two-tailed 
 
Dependent Variable: Average support for candidate in the network, all respondents. 
 
Note: If a coefficient did not attain statistical significance, we rounded to two decimal 
places.  If a coefficient attained statistical significance, we rounded to the highest 
possible decimal place up to two digits.
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Table 5.  Coefficients, T-Values, and Statistical Significances for Discussant Vote 
Based on Residual Network Support and Dyad Gender Homophily.   
 
Dyad Residual 
support 
Coefficient T-value Statistical Significance 
    p<.01 p<.05 p<.10 
 
 
Change in Gore Feeling Thermometer  
Male Respondent, 
Male Discussant 
0 9.61 3.90 x   
1 6.39 4.23 x   
2 3.17 1.36 
   
3 -0.05 0.01 
   
Male Respondent, 
Female Discussant 
0 9.53 2.84 x   
1 4.69 2.06 
 x  
2 -0.15 0.04 
   
3 -4.99 0.78 
   
Female 
Respondent, Male 
Discussant 
0 9.00 3.51 x   
1 4.53 2.49 
 x  
2 0.06 0.02 
   
3 -4.41 1.07 
   
Female 
Respondent, 
Female Discussant 
0 7.67 3.14 x   
1 6.46 3.82 x   
2 5.25 1.89 
  x 
3 4.04 0.80 
   
 
 
Change in Bush Feeling Thermometer 
Male Respondent, 
Male Discussant 
0 5.20 2.01 
 x  
1 2.90 1.88 
 x  
2 0.60 0.26 
   
3 -1.70 0.43 
   
Male Respondent, 
Female Discussant 
0 8.27 2.17 
 x  
1 8.01 3.05 x   
2 7.75 2.46 
 x  
3 7.49 1.54 
   
Female 
Respondent, Male 
Discussant 
0 5.69 2.15 
 x  
1 4.36 2.45 
 x  
2 3.03 1.18 
   
3 1.70 0.41 
   
Female 
Respondent, 
Female Discussant 
0 8.78 2.91 x   
1 9.93 5.06 x   
2 11.08 4.28 x   
3 12.23 2.91 x   
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Figure 4.  Impact of Discussant on Change in Gore and Bush Feeling Thermometors 
based on Residual Support for the Discussant's Candidate Choice in the Network. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.  Variable Descriptions and Statistics for Respondent-Level Data Set. 
 
 
Variable Description N Min, 
Max 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Percent 
Supporting 
Gore 
 
% of network discussants R 
believed voted for Gore 
1650 0, 1 0.25 0.37 
Percent 
Supporting 
Bush 
 
% of network discussants R 
believed voted for Gore 
1650 0, 1 0.26 0.38 
Female 
 
1=woman, 0=man 1807 0, 1 0.56 0.50 
Education 
 
 
Highest grade completed 
(17=17 or more) 
1795 2, 17 13.64 2.31 
Age 
 
 
Respondent self-reported age 
(97=97 or older) 
1798 18, 97 47.21 16.96 
Union 
Member 
 
Respondent self-reported 
member of union. 
1795 0, 1 0.14 0.45 
Married 
 
Currently married. 1793 0, 1 0.52 0.50 
Partisanship 
 
 
 
Self-reported partisanship (-1 
= Republican, 0 = 
Independent, 1 = Democrat) 
1771 -1, 1 0.09 0.77 
Network 
Size 
 
Number of discussants named 
by R 
1807 0, 4 1.59 1.52 
Network 
Gender 
% of network that are female 1800 0, 1 0.27 0.35 
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Table B.  Variable Descriptions and Statistics for Dyad-Level Data Set. 
 
 
Variable Description N Min, 
Max 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Change in 
Feeling 
Thermometer 
(Gore) 
 
Gore Post-Election Feeling - 
Gore Pre-Election Feeling 
Thermometer 
2863 -100, 
100 
-2.26 29.24 
Change in 
Feeling 
Thermometer 
(Bush) 
 
Bush Post-Election Feeling - 
Bush Pre-Election Feeling 
Thermometer 
2870 -100, 
100 
0.92 31.39 
Pre-Election 
Feeling 
Thermometer 
(Gore) 
 
 2875 0, 100 56.11 25.98 
Pre-Election 
Feeling 
Thermometer 
(Bush) 
 
 2875 0, 100 55.62 26.30 
Discussant 
Vote (Gore) 
 
Respondent reported that 
Discussant voted for Gore 
2664 0, 1 0.41 0.49 
Discussant 
Vote (Bush) 
 
Respondent reported that 
Discussant voted for Bush 
2664 0, 1 0.45 0.50 
Residual 
Support 
(Gore) 
 
Number of other discussants 
supporting Gore in network. 
2432 0, 3 0.80 0.91 
Residual 
Support 
(Bush) 
Number of other discussants 
supporting Bush in network. 
2432 0, 3 0.92 0.99 
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Table C.  Effect of Discussant Vote Choice on Respondent Evaluation of Gore by Respondent and Discussant Gender, OLS 
Regression with Clustered Standard Errors. 
 
 
 
Male Respondent 
 
 
Female Respondent 
Male Discussant Female Discussant Male Discussant Female Discussant 
 
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
 
Partisanship 
 
Discussant Gore Vote 
 
Partisanship x Discussant 
 
Residual Gore Support 
 
Discussant Vote x Residual 
 
Pre-Election Thermometer 
 
Constant 
 
 
7.01 
 
7.61 
 
-0.69 
 
4.06 
 
-3.22 
 
-0.72 
 
31.48 
 
 
0.60*** 
 
2.46*** 
 
0.83 
 
1.59** 
 
1.68* 
 
0.03*** 
 
31.48 
 
6.79 
 
9.53 
 
-0.21 
 
7.44 
 
-5.84 
 
-0.76 
 
31.75 
 
 
0.90*** 
 
3.35*** 
 
1.09 
 
2.77*** 
 
2.86** 
 
0.05*** 
 
3.38 
 
6.16 
 
9.00 
 
0.14 
 
5.83 
 
-4.47 
 
-0.76 
 
34.72 
 
0.66*** 
 
2.56*** 
 
0.91 
 
1.39*** 
 
1.83** 
 
0.04*** 
 
2.67*** 
 
8.89 
 
7.67 
 
-1.64 
 
2.38 
 
-1.21 
 
-0.84 
 
41.59 
 
 
0.61*** 
 
2.44*** 
 
0.78** 
 
1.55 
 
2.00 
 
0.03*** 
 
2.55*** 
 
N 
F-test 
R2 
Root MSE 
 
 
       737 
         109.22*** 
           0.55 
         19.21 
 
       379 
         54.95*** 
           0.59 
         19.21 
 
     626 
       86.01*** 
           0.57  
         18.76 
 
       639 
       192.06*** 
           0.66 
         18.51 
*p<.10, two-tailed test **p<.05, two-tailed test ***p<.01, two-tailed test 
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Table D.  Effect of Discussant Vote Choice on Respondent Evaluation of Bush by Respondent and Discussant Gender, OLS 
Regression with Clustered Standard Errors. 
 
 
 
Male Respondent 
 
 
Female Respondent 
Male Discussant Female Discussant Male Discussant Female Discussant 
 
Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
 
Partisanship 
 
Discussant Bush Vote 
 
Partisanship x Discussant 
 
Residual Bush Support 
 
Discussant Vote x Residual 
 
Pre-Election Thermometer 
 
Constant 
 
 
-5.81 
 
5.20 
 
-1.15 
 
4.90 
 
-2.30 
 
-0.78 
 
39.57 
 
0.71*** 
 
2.59** 
 
0.87 
 
1.51*** 
 
1.90 
 
0.03*** 
 
2.67*** 
 
-5.22 
 
8.26 
 
-1.49 
 
4.34 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.82 
 
39.84 
 
0.89*** 
 
3.80** 
 
1.35 
 
1.64*** 
 
2.30 
 
0.05*** 
 
3.37*** 
 
-6.49 
 
5.69 
 
-0.08 
 
4.42 
 
1.33 
 
-0.77 
 
37.34 
 
0.72*** 
 
2.64** 
 
0.88 
 
1.57*** 
 
1.90 
 
0.03*** 
 
2.62*** 
 
-7.06 
 
8.78 
 
-1.02 
 
3.93 
 
1.15 
 
-0.87 
 
41.40 
 
0.83*** 
 
3.02*** 
 
1.04 
 
1.68** 
 
2.01 
 
0.03*** 
 
2.76 
 
N 
F-test 
R2 
Root MSE 
 
 
       741 
         134.82*** 
           0.64 
         17.53 
 
       379 
         66.84*** 
           0.64 
         18.36 
 
     626 
       101.56*** 
           0.58  
         20.55 
 
       636 
       210.40*** 
           0.68 
         20.18 
*p<.10, two-tailed test **p<.05, two-tailed test ***p<.01, two-tailed test 
